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Abstract
In this supplementary appendix, we study various extensions of the model in the
paper. More specifically, in Section A we allow for election in the first period; in
Section B we study the setting with arbitrary number of periods and convex distortions
discussed in the body of the paper; in Section C we analyze a model analogous to the
one presented in the paper in which agents are characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer
(2004) preferences; in Section D we allow for consumption in period 1, in addition to
periods 2 and 3.
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A. Period 1 Elections
The model studied in the paper allowed for government actions and elections in periods
2 and 3. We now extend the model to consider elections in period 1 as well.
The objective of this extension is to evaluate whether collective action in period 1 could
effectively satisfy the demand for commitment agents display in period 1 or at least limit the
distortions associated with debt accumulation in period 2. It turns out, however, that the
equilibrium consumption sequence and the total amount of resources destroyed is completely
unaffected by period 1 elections. The only thing that changes is that there is a multiplicity
of equilibria determining the timing of distortions.
The economic environment is the same as the one assumed in the previous sections. There
are two candidates running for office, both in period 1 and in period 2. The candidates are
office motivated. The policy space is extended to allow candidates to offer a transfer y1 and
a lump-sum tax t1 in period 1, as well as a transfer y2 and tax t2 in period 2 (elections in
period 3 are redundant as before). Debt financing is allowed. Tax collection in any period
carries distortions of a unit loss η > 0 for every unit collected. For this robustness check, we
focus on the case of high debt limit, d ≥ d∗∗.
By taxing themselves in period 1 and investing the proceeds in the liquid asset agents
can effectively commit resources for consumption in period 2 and hence reduce debt accu-
mulation. On the other hand, if the proceeds of taxes carried to period 2 are smaller than
d∗∗, in per-capita terms, a strict majority of agents in period 2 will support a positive debt
level so as to increase consumption in period 2. Let t = t1 − y1 denote per-capita taxes in
period 1 and d = y2 − t2 denote debt in period 2. It turns out that even though by taxing
themselves in period 1 agents can indeed limit debt accumulation in period 2, this strategy
simply shifts some of the repayment of debt from period 3 to period 1, but does not alter
total distortions and has no ultimate effects on consumption profiles.
Proposition A. 1 In the economy with consumption and elections in every period and with
high debt limit, d ≥ d∗∗, the set of equilibria is characterized by pairs of period 1 taxes and
period 2 debt of the form (t, d) such that t ∈ [0, d∗∗] and d = d∗∗− t; total agents’ distortions
and consumption profiles are unchanged relative to the case in which elections take place only
in period 2.1
It is easy to show that debt limits would be the only way to reduce distortions even in
the model with period 1 elections. The reason is that any limit on period 1 surpluses would
1Only if the distortion on taxes at t = 1 were smaller than the distortion on taxes at t = 3 election in
period 1 would help reducing debt in period 2 and hence distortions in period 3.
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just shift the financing to higher debt in the second period. It is also easy to show that in the
case of convex distortions the indeterminacy would disappear and period 1 elections would
have no effect whatsoever.
Of course, the debt limit may be endogenously determined via voting. Suppose, for
instance, that in period 1 agents vote on the debt limit that would affect the debt imposed
in period 2 as in the model studied thus far. In such a setting, all agents would favor
low debt limits in period 1. In fact, since illiquid assets allow agents to commit without
experiencing the loss of wealth that results from distortionary debt, equilibrium would entail
a debt limit fixed at zero. Of course, if agents could vote again on the debt limit in period
2 (prior to determining the debt level itself, as in the model studied thus far), they would
collectively choose a positive debt limit and consumption would be distorted (relative to the
commitment paths). This suggests the importance of timing in constitutional reform. Since
most amendments take a substantial amount of time to pass, changes in debt limits are
likely to occur a significant time prior to the ‘temptation’ of consumption. Even if multiple
elections occurred over such amendments, it would be difficult to achieve a super-majority
to agree over time on an increase on the debt limit itself (as pointed above, early in the
process, one would expect voters to reject debt limit increases).
B. Arbitrary Number of Periods and Convex Distor-
tions
We now study an economy that lasts for an arbitrary number of period T . We later
consider the limit case as T → ∞. In this section, we allow for consumption in period
1 as this in fact simplifies the notation in this case. For simplicity, in this section we
assume that agents’ preferences also satisfy certain Inada conditions, namely we assume
that limc→0 u′(c) = ∞. The analysis illustrates the robustness of the main messages of the
paper when there is repeated feedback from voters, be it through elections per-se, or via
other channels such as electoral polls.
As in the analysis of the previous sections, we assume that agents can choose to invest
in liquid or illiquid assets and that these assets have equal zero interest rate. An illiquid
asset with maturity m, acquired in period t, pays off in period t + m and cannot be sold
before then. To isolate the effects of the interaction of time-inconsistency and fiscal policy
on debt accumulation as in the previous sections, we make the strong assumption that in
any period t = 1, ..., T − 2 illiquid assets are available with any maturity m between 2 and
T − t. A liquid asset has maturity 1. We assume that liquid assets are available in any
period t = 1, ..., T − 1. Absent government intervention, by appropriate choice of the mix
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of liquid and illiquid assets with different maturities, an agent can commit to any desired
consumption stream.
Elections occur in any period t ≥ 2. Period T elections are vacuous and period 1 elections
can be shown to be irrelevant (when distortions are convex). Let Dt denote accumulated
debt at t, while dt denotes the deficit at time t.
Consider first the economy with linear distortions η such that β(1 + η) < 1. It is easy to
extend the analysis of Section 4.2 to construct an equilibrium in which debt is accumulated
until period T − 1 and is repaid completely only in the last period, time T . Furthermore, at
each time 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 agents consume exclusively off of debt; whereas at time T , agents
consume off of time 1 savings:
ct = dt, for any 2 ≤ t < T ; cT = s1T − (1 + η)DT−1.
With linear distortions agents have no incentive to smooth debt repayment and the
repayment is thus concentrated at time T .2 Debt then explodes as the number of periods
increases. It is clear, however, that the linearity of distortions plays a fundamental role in
this construction. We show next that even when distortions are strictly convex, so that there
is a motive to smooth repayments over time, debt accumulation can be large when voters
are time inconsistent and the political system does not impose debt limits.
To clarify notation, though somewhat redundantly, we make explicit the distinction be-
tween deficit and repayment and let dt ≥ 0 and qt ≥ 0 denote, respectively deficits and
repayments at time t. Recall that Dt denotes debt accumulated up to (and including) time
t: Dt =
∑t
τ=2 dt−qt. We assume that tax distortions η(q) are smooth, non-negative, strictly
increasing and strictly convex in q:
η(q) is a twice continuously differentiable function which satisfies:
η(q) > 0, η′(q) > 0, η′′(q) > 0, for q > 0; and η(0) = η′(0) = 0 (1)
The total cost of repayment q, defined as A(q) = q (1 + η(q)), is then also increasing and
convex, strictly for any q > 0, with A(0) = 0 and A′(0) = 1.
As in the economy studied in the previous sections, at equilibrium deficits and repayments
are the outcome of the electoral process, while investments in the liquid and illiquid assets
available in financial markets are derived from individual choices, taking as given election
outcome.
2Note that in our formulation distortions are incurred only when debt is repaid, independently of how
far in the future it is in fact repayed (recall returns are zero). This is intended to represent an environment
in which debt is repaid by means of distortionary taxation.
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At time t = 1 agents invest in liquid and illiquid assets, determining a sequence of
savings in illiquid assets s1t for any time t > 1. Agents can in principle rebalance their asset
portfolio at any time t > 1. But since a full set of illiquid assets are available in financial
markets, agents can effectively implement commitment strategies and hence the option to
rebalance investment portfolios in the future has no effect on the equilibrium consumption
sequence nor on the equilibrium of the electoral process.3 Therefore, for any given deficit and
repayment sequence {dt, qt}Tt=2, the investment problem of any agent at time t = 1 involves
the choice of the sequence of period 1 savings in illiquid assets {s1t ≥ 0}Tt=1 corresponding
to the maximization problem:
max u(s11) + β
∑T
t=2 u(s1t + dt − A (qt))
s.t.
∑T
t=1 s1t = k
(2)
The political economy problem at any election at time t ≥ 2 involves two candidates
running for office choosing electoral platforms to maximize the probability of elections. As in
Section 3, however, the strategic interaction between the candidates is reduced at equilibrium
to the solution of a single choice problem at any election time t. In the economy with an
arbitrary but finite number of periods T , by backward induction, this problem can be reduced
to the choice of maps dt(Dt−1), qt(Dt−1) ≥ 0, for given time 1 transfers {s1τ}Tτ=t and given
expected future maps dτ (Dτ−1), qτ (Dτ−1) for all t+ 1 ≤ τ ≤ T to
max u (s1t + dt(Dt−1)− A (qτ (Dτ−1))) + β
∑T
τ=t+1 u (s1τ + dτ (Dτ−1)− A (qτ (Dτ−1)))
s.t.
∑T
t=2 dt − qt = 0.
(3)
Of course, deficits and repayments will not both be positive at the same time t: dt · qt = 0.
We are now ready to characterize equilibrium debt accumulation and repayment. To
better illustrate the structure of equilibrium it is convenient to re-consider first the case in
which T = 3 and construct the equilibrium for the case of convex distortions. The T = 3
economy is special in that debt accumulation necessarily occurs in period 2 and repayment
is concentrated in the last period T = 3. The first order condition of the political economy
problem (the commitment constraint from our analysis of linear distortions) is given by:
u′ (d2 + s12) = βA′(q3)u′ (s13 − A(q3)) .
In contrast with the model with linear distortions, however, the equilibrium level of debt need
not be determined by a corner solution for consumption. At an interior solution, positive
3Note however, that the same consumption pattern could in principle be obtained with different transfer
sequences, if portfolio rebalancing after period 1 were allowed.
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savings s12 and s13 are chosen to smooth consumption so that u
′(d2 + s12) = u′(s13 −A(q3))
and hence
βA′(q3) = 1 (4)
and c2 = c3. When, on the other hand, a corner solution obtains with s12 = 0 (s13 is
always positive by Inada conditions), u′ (d2) < u′ (s13 − A(q3)) and c2 = d2 > c3. In this
case, the political economy conditions imply that βA′(q) < 1. Corner solutions obtain when
the A′ (q) does not grow sufficiently quickly, given the size of the debt, to guarantee that
βA′ (q) = 1. Alternatively, these corners arise when the size of the economy, measured by
the total endowment k, is not large enough to ensure that debt and q are sufficiently large to
guarantee that βA′ (q) = 1. This is also the case in general, for T > 3: when k is relatively
small with respect to q,the economy behaves effectively like the one with linear distortions
and β(1 + η) < 1: it displays corners of debt accumulation until t = T − 1, with repayment
concentrated in the last period, at T .4
From now on we restrict ourselves to the more interesting case in which, fixing the function
A(q), the total endowment k is sufficiently “large.” In this case, when T > 3, we show that
the dynamics of fiscal policy is characterized by two distinct phases: debt is accumulated
first and then repaid. It still turns out that in the debt accumulation phase agents are at
a corner in the sense that they consume exclusively off of government spending, as in the
economy with linear distortions. However, debt repayment is smoothed over time and the
equilibrium is interior during the repayment phase.
Proposition B. 1 In the economy with T > 3 the equilibrium consumption sequence has
the following properties: there exists a t˜ ≥ 2 such that: for t ≤ t˜ the government accumulates
debt; for t > t˜ the government gradually repays the debt. Furthermore:
1. In the repayment phase, for t > t˜, the equilibrium is interior and ct = s1t − A (qt).
2. Up to the last period of the debt accumulation phase, for 2 ≤ t ≤ t˜−1, agents consume
exclusively off of deficit-financed spending: s1t = 0, ct = dt;
5 in contrast, in the last
period accumulation period (t = t˜) savings and debt are both positive ct˜ = s1t˜ +dt˜, with
s1t > 0.
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. First of all we derive first order conditions of the two
maximization problems discussed in the text:
4This is formally shown as a by-product of the proof of Proposition 8 in the Online Appendix.
5This statement is empty if t˜ = 2. However, for T and/or k sufficiently large we must have t˜ > 2.
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• The investment problem of any agent at time t = 1 choosing the sequence of period
1 savings in illiquid assets {s1t ≥ 0}Tt=1, for any given deficit and repayment sequence
{dt, qt}Tt=2:
max u(s11) + β
∑T
t=2 u(s1t + dt − A (qt))
s.t.
∑T
t=1 s1t = k;
(I)
• The political economy problem at any election at time t ≥ 2, reduced to the choice of
maps dt(Dt−1), qt(Dt−1) ≥ 0, for given time 1 transfers {s1τ}Tτ=t and given expected
future maps dτ (Dτ−1), qτ (Dτ−1) for all t+ 1 ≤ τ ≤ T :
max u (s1t + dt(Dt−1)− A (qτ (Dτ−1))) + β
∑T
τ=t+1 u (s1τ + dτ (Dτ−1)− A (qτ (Dτ−1)))
s.t.
∑T
t=2 dt − qt = 0.
(PE)
We then derive several implications, notably regarding the structure of the debt accu-
mulation and repayment phases at equilibrium. To this end we exploit the condition that k
is large enough, but we obtain as a by-product a characterization of the structure of equi-
libria when the condition is not imposed. Finally, we derive properties of the consumption
sequence at equilibrium.
Recall the government’s budget balance, the constraint in Problem PE is:
T∑
t=2
dt − qt = 0. (5)
By definition, Dt =
∑t
τ=2 dτ − qτ . It then follows that (5) can also be written as Dt +∑T
τ=t+1 dτ − qτ = 0, for any t ≥ 2; which in turn implies, for t = T , DT = 0. Furthermore,
using again the definition of Dt and taking derivatives, dDt = ddt and dDt = −dqt. Let
Jq(τ) (respectively Jd(τ)) denote the subset of periods j > τ such that qj > 0 (respectively.
dj ≥ 0 with qt = 0). Therefore, government’s budget balance, (5), implies∑
j∈Jq(τ)
∂qj
∂Dτ
−
∑
j∈Jd(τ)
∂dj
∂Dτ
= 1. (6)
Notice that, at equilibrium, dt > 0 for some 2 ≤ t ≤ T . This can be shown by contradic-
tion and along the lines of Proposition 2. Government budget balance, equation (5), implies
that qτ > 0 for some 2 ≤ τ ≤ T . Consider a period 2 ≤ τ < T such that qτ > 0. The first
order condition of Problem PE at τ is:
0 = A′(qτ )u′(s1τ − qτ )− β
 ∑
j∈Jq(τ)
A′(qj)u′(cj)
∂qj
∂Dτ
−
∑
j∈Jd(τ)
u′(cj)
∂dj
∂Dτ
 (7)
7
Consider instead a period 2 ≤ t < T such that dt ≥ 0, with qt = 0. The first order condition
of Problem PE at t is:
0 = u′(dt + s1t)− β
 ∑
j∈Jq(t)
A′(qj)u′(cj)
∂qj
∂Dτ
−
∑
j∈Jd(t)
u′(cj)
∂dj
∂Dτ
 (8)
Recall that, by the implications of (5) derived above,
∑
j∈Jq(t)
∂qj
∂Dτ
−∑j∈Jd(t) ∂dj∂Dτ = 1. Fur-
thermore, it can be shown that the first order conditions of problem PE imply that
∂qj
∂Dτ
> 0 and
∂dj
∂Dτ
< 0, for all j > τ. (9)
This is a consequence of consumption smoothing and can be formally shown by deriving
envelope conditions from (8).
Notice that the solution of Problem I requires
u′(dj + s1j) ≤ u′(s1j′ − qj′) for all j ∈ Jd(1), j′ ∈ Jq(1), (10)
with equality for all j, j′ such that s1j, s1,j′ > 0 (that is, when the solution of Problem I
is interior). As a consequence, in particular, the solution of Problem I requires that u′(cj)
be constant for all j such that qj > 0, that is for j ∈ Jq(1). This is so because, by Inada
conditions, qj > 0 implies s1j > 0.
Conditions (7) and (8) allow us to characterize the structure of the debt accumulation
and repayment phases at equilibrium. We show that i) qT > 0 and that ii) qτ > 0 implies
that qj > 0 for all j > τ . To prove i) we proceed by contradiction, postulating that dT ≥ 0
with qT = 0. Consider first the case in which qT−1 > 0. Then 7) implies
A′(qT−1)u′(cT−1) = βu′(dT + s1T )
But qT−1 > 0 implies that A′(qT−1) > 1, while β < 1. As a consequence, the condition cannot
be satisfied as it requires u′(cT−1 < u′(dT + s1T ), which is in contradiction with (10) and
hence with the solution of Problem I. The same logic applies to any candidate equilibrium
characterized by an uninterrupted sequence of dj ≥ 0, from some t up to T and qt−1 > 0.
We conclude qT > 0. The proof of ii) also runs by contradiction, postulating that qτ > 0 and
dj ≥ 0 with qj = 0, for some j > τ (recall that dtqt = 0 and hence dt > 0 implies qt = 0).
Consider first the case that qT−2 > 0, and dT−1 ≥ 0 with qT−1 = 0. Recall we have just
shown that qT > 0. Then (7) implies
A′(qT−2)u′(cT−2) = β
[
A′(qT )u′(cT )
∂qT
∂DT−2
− u′(dT−1 + s1T−1) ∂dT−1
∂DT−2
]
u′(dT−1 + s1T−1) = βA′(qT )u′(cT )
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But qT−2 > 0, qT > 0 imply A′(qT−2), A′(qT ) > 0 and u′(cT−2) = u′(cT ) as an implica-
tion of (10). Furthermore, Using (9), the first equation can then be written as A′(qT−2) =
β
[
A′(qT )
∂qT
∂DT−2
+ u
′(cT−1)
u′(cT )
| ∂dT−1
∂DT−2
|
]
and by government’s budget balance, equation (5),
∂qT
∂DT−2
+ | ∂dT−1
∂DT−2
| = 1. Also, dT−1 ≥ 0 with qT−1) = 0 implies u
′(cT−1)
u′(cT )
≤ 1 by (10).
As a consequence, the first equation implies βA′(qT ) > 1, which when substituted into the
second requires u
′(cT−1)
u′(cT )
> 1, a contradiction with (10). The same logic applies to any can-
didate equilibrium such that qτ > 0 is followed at some t > τ by qt = 0 with dt ≥ 0. We
conclude that qτ > 0 implies that qj > 0 for all j > τ .
We now show that, for k large enough, βA′(qT ) > 1 (recall that qT > 0). Suppose on the
contrary that βA′(qT ) ≤ 1. Conditions (7) and (8) then imply that dT−1 > 0 and:
u′(dT−1) = βA′(qT )u′(cT ).6 (11)
It is straightforward to show that Problem I implies that, at equilibrium, cT must increase
without bound with the total size of the economy, k. Then, keeping βA′(qT ) bounded above
by 1, (11) implies that dT−1 also increases unboundedly with k. But qT ≥ dT−1 by (5) and
hence, for k large enough, it must be that βA′(qT ) > 1, the desired contradiction.
Thus, we only need to consider the case in which βA′(qT ) > 1. In this case, conditions (7)
and (8) imply that qT−1 > 0. Indeed the solution of Problem PE involves then repayments
qτ > 0 for any τ ≤ T greater than some t˜ ≥ 2. In this case, condition (7), the first order
condition of Problem PE, takes the form:
0 = A′(qτ )u′(s1τ − qτ )− β
[
T∑
j=τ+1
A′(qj)u′(cj)
∂qj
∂Dτ
]
Furthermore, (6) reduces to
∑T
j=τ+1
∂qj
∂Dτ
= 1. But, if qτ > 0 for any τ greater than some
t˜ ≥ 2, the first order conditions corresponding to the agent’s optimization at time t = 1 are
interior and s1j > 0, for any τ ≤ j ≤ T . The implication of (10) that we derived above then
implies that u′(cj) is constant for any j ≥ τ . As a consequence cj as well as cj + ∂qj∂Dτ are
constant in j and so is
∂qj
∂Dτ
. In particular, then, ∂qτ
∂Dτ
= 1
T−τ . Summing up, the first order
conditions of Problem PE are reduced to
A′(qτ ) =
β
T − τ
[
T∑
j=τ+1
A′(qj)
]
. (12)
6Indeed, this argument implies that, at equilibrium, qt = 0 and dt > 0 for any 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1: debt is
accumulated until period T − 1 and repayed at time T .
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This ends our proof of part 1 in the statement of Proposition 8.
Having shown that, for k large enough, the dynamics of debt has an accumulation phase
followed by a re-payment phase, and having characterized the equilibrium conditions of the
repayment phase, we now study the debt accumulation phase. Let t˜ denote the last time
τ such that deficit is strictly positive. We now show that the equilibrium condition at t˜
is interior and hence u′(ct˜) = u
′(cτ ), for any t˜ < τ ≤ T . We proceed by contradiction.
We have shown that a repayment qτ > 0 occurs when expected future marginal distortions
β
T−τ
[∑T
j=τ+1A
′(qj)
]
> 1. At t˜ then:
β
T − t˜
 T∑
j=t˜+1
A′(qj)
 ≤ 1.
Assume by way of contradiction that β
T−t˜
[∑T
j=t˜+1A
′(qj)
]
< 1. This implies β
T−t˜A
′(qt˜+1) <
1 − β
T−t˜
[∑T
j=t˜+2A
′(qj)
]
. But since qt˜+1 > 0 by assumption, the first order conditions at
t˜+1 imply β
T−t˜
[∑T
j=t˜+2A
′(qj)
]
> 1, and hence β
T−t˜A
′(qt˜+1) < 0 which is impossible. We can
conclude then that
β
T − t˜
 T∑
j=t˜+1
A′(qj)
 = 1 (13)
which implies u′(dt˜) = u
′(ct˜+1).
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We now study the debt accumulation phase up to period t˜. Consider the first order
conditions for Problem PE at t˜ − 1, equation (8). In the accumulation phase these are
reduced to:
0 = u′(s1t˜−1 + dt˜−1) + βu
′(s1t˜ + dt˜)
[
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−1
+
β
T − t
[
T∑
τ=t
A′(qτ )
]
∂qτ
∂Dt˜−1
]
.
But the (interior) first order conditions of the agent optimization choice at time t = 1 implies
that ct˜ is constant and hence Dt˜ is also constant:
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−1
= −1 and ∂qτ
∂Dt˜−1
= 0, for any τ > t˜
7In other words, if u′(dt˜) < u
′(ct˜+1) then in fact the equilibrium will have an extra period of debt
accumulation; that is, the last period of debt accumulation will in fact be t˜ + 1. As a consequence, note
that a corner solution with s1t˜ = 0 can in fact occur in the T = 3 economy, in which debt is necessarily
accumulated at t = 2 and there cannot be an extra period of accumulation as repayment must occur at
t = 3; see the analysis of this case in the text.
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It follows then that the first order conditions in Problem I must hold at the corner st˜−1 = 0:
u′(dt˜−1) = βu
′(s1t˜ + dt˜)
The argument can be extended backwards to imply that cτ = dτ , for any 2 ≤ τ ≤ t˜− 1.
Consider period t˜ − 2. Using again the fact that the (interior) first order conditions of the
agent optimization choice at time t = 1 imply that ct˜ is constant and hence Dt˜ is also
constant, the first order condition of Problem PE are reduced to:
0 = u′(s1t˜−2 + dt˜−2) + β
[
u′(dt˜−1)
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
+ u′(s1t˜ + dt˜)
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
]
Substituting u′(dt˜−1) = βu
′(s1t˜ + dt˜) we have
0 = u′(s1t˜−2 + dt˜−2) + βu
′(s1t˜ + dt˜)
[
β
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
]
But
[
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
]
= −1; and hence (9) implies that |
[
β
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
]
|< 1. Then again
the first order conditions of Problem I must hold at the corner st˜−2 = 0. Furthermore, using
the first order conditions we obtained at t˜ − 2 and t˜ − 1 it follows directly by concavity,
using |
[
β
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
]
|< 1, that dt˜−2 > dt˜−1. Proceeding recursively back in time, more
generally for any 2 ≤ t˜− 1, the first order conditions will have a similar structure:
0 = u′(s1t + dt) + βu′(s1t˜ + dt˜)
 t˜∑
j=t+1
j
∂dj
∂Dt
 (14)
for some 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 such that |:
∑t˜
j=t+1 j
∂dj
∂Dt
:|:< 1. As a consequence, cτ = dτ , for any
2 ≤ τ ≤ t˜− 1. This ends our proof of part 2 in the statement of the proposition.
It may be surprising that, even in the case of convex distortions, in the accumulation
phase agents consume exclusively off of deficit (the equilibrium deficit is determined by a
corner condition for savings). The intuition for this result is the following: the marginal
condition that characterizes the voting equilibrium at t˜ essentially determines the maximal
level of debt Dt˜. Other things being equal, this condition trades off the marginal cost of
future distortions due to an increase in debt and the marginal benefit of an increase in
consumption at t˜. At every time t < t˜, therefore, an increase in debt has a positive marginal
effect on current consumption without affecting the level of debt at t˜ (since consumption in
period t˜ falls by the same amount), and hence without affecting the future cost of distortions
at the margin. The smoothing of distortions therefore only plays a role in the repayment
phase.
The following corollary characterizes the equilibrium in more detail.
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Corollary B. 1 In the economy with T > 3, in equilibrium, the sequences of deficits, re-
payments, and consumption have the following properties:
1. In the repayment phase, for t > t˜, the sequence of repayments qt > 0 is strictly
increasing over time and consumption ct is constant in t.
2. Up to the last period of the debt accumulation phase, for 2 ≤ t ≤ t˜ − 1, consumption
ct and the deficit dt are decreasing over time; in contrast, consumption in period t˜ is
equalized to subsequent consumption ct˜ = ct for any t > t˜.
Proof. In the proof of Proposition B.1 we have shown that the first order condition of
Problem PE, in the repayment phase, are reduced to (12). We now show that A′(qt) is an
increasing sequence in t. To this end it is sufficient to write (12) recursively as follows:
A′(qT−1) = βA′(qT ),
A′(qT−2) =
β
2
(1 + β)A′(qT ),
A′(qT−3) =
β
3
(1 + β)
(
1 +
β
2
)
A′(qT ),
...
A′(qt) =
β
T − t
T−t−1∏
j=1
(
1 +
β
j
)
A′(qT ).
It can now be directly checked that the sequence β
T−t
∏T−t−1
j=1
(
1 + β
j
)
is increasing in t for
given T .
The sequence A′(qt) is then increasing in t and so is the sequence qt, as A(q) is strictly convex.
Furthermore, as qt > 0 in the repayment phase, s1t must also be, by Inada conditions. The
solution of Problem I is then interior, which implies that consumption is equalized across
time. Finally, in the proof of Proposition B.1 we have shown that at t˜ distortions must
satisfy (13) and that the solution of Problem I is interior at t˜. This implies that ct˜ = ct˜+1.
But, by our previous characterization of the repayment phase in this corollary, ct˜+1 = cτ , for
any τ > t˜+ 1.
We now show that dt is decreasing over time in the debt accumulation phase. To this
end we need to show that the absolute value of the expression
[∑t˜
j=t+1 αj
∂dj
∂Dt
]
in equation
(14) is increasing in t.
We first establish that
∂dj
∂Dt
change by the same factor for any j when t changes:
∂dj
∂Dt
∂dj′
∂Dt
=
∂dj
∂Dt′
∂dj′
∂Dt′
, 2 < j, j′ ≤ t˜, 2 ≤ k < min{j, j′} (15)
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Indeed, consider the first order condition at time t˜ − 1: u′(ct˜−1) = βu′(ct˜). Differentiating,
the Envelope Theorem implies,
u′′(ct˜−1)
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
= βu′′(ct˜)
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
;
but also that
u′′(ct˜−1)
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−3
= βu′′(ct˜)
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−3
.
It follows that
∂d
t˜
∂D
t˜−2
∂d
t˜−1
∂D
t˜−2
=
∂d
t˜
∂D
t˜−3
∂d
t˜−1
∂D
t˜−3
. It is straightforward to see that in fact the argument holds for
any 2 ≤ k < t˜− 1. Furthermore, the same logic can be repeated on the first order condition
at time t˜− 2. In fact, after differentiating and recalling that, for any τ > t, ∂dtau
∂Dt
< 0 by (9),
we obtain:
u′′(ct˜−2)
∂dt˜−2
∂Dt˜−k
= βu′′(ct˜) | β
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
+
∂d ˜t−1
∂Dt˜−2
| ∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−k
;
and hence
∂d
t˜
∂D
t˜−k
∂d
t˜−2
∂D
t˜−k
is constant in k. Once again, the same argument holds for t˜− 3, t˜− 4 and
so on backwards until period 2.
Simplify notation by letting | ∑t˜j=t+1 j ∂dj∂Dt | be denoted Γt. Then, developing first
order conditions backwards from t˜− 1 we have:
Γt˜−1 = β
Γt˜−2 = | β
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
|
Γt˜−3 = | βΓt˜−2
∂dt˜−2
∂Dt˜−3
+ β
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−3
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−3
|
Γt˜−4 = | βΓt˜−3
∂dt˜−3
∂Dt˜−4
+ Γt˜−2
∂dt˜−2
∂Dt˜−3
+ Γt˜−2
∂dt˜−2
∂Dt˜−4
+ β
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−4
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−4
|
.....
Using (15), however the sequence of first order conditions can be written as follows:
Γt˜−1 = β
Γt˜−2 = |: β
∂dt˜−1
∂Dt˜−2
+
∂dt˜
∂Dt˜−2
|
Γt˜−3 = βΓt˜−2 |
∂dt˜−2
∂Dt˜−3
+ Γt˜−2
(
1− | ∂dt˜−2
∂Dt˜−3
|
)
Γt˜−4 = βΓt˜−3 |
∂dt˜−3
∂Dt˜−4
| +Γt˜−3
(
1− | ∂dt˜−3
∂Dt˜−4
|
)
.....
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and hence Γt is increasing in t.
We have shown that along the repayment phase, the first order conditions reduce to:
A′(qt) =
β
T − t
[
T∑
τ=t+1
A′(qτ )
]
(12)
Equation (12) implies that distortions are indeed smoothed at the margin: it requires
in fact that at any time t in the repayment phase, the marginal distortion A′(qt) be equal
to the average future marginal distortion, 1
T−t
[∑T
τ=t+1A
′(qτ )
]
discounted by β. It is the
discounting by β > 0 which induces an increasing sequence of marginal distortions A′(qt)
and hence of repayments qt.
Furthermore, in equilibrium, it has to be the case that, at any time t in the repayment
phase, the marginal distortion is > 1. Otherwise the agent would vote for accumulating debt
in period t: an increase in consumption at t would have a larger effect at the margin than
the induced marginal cost of future distortions. This is guaranteed by the condition that
k be large enough. Finally, as qt > 0 in the repayment phase, s1t must also be, by Inada
conditions. The solution of the problem of the agent at time 1, Problem (I), is then interior:
agents at time 1 will use transfers to equalize consumption and hence ct will be constant.
This is the case for the entire repayment phase.
The last period of the debt accumulation phase is characterized by the fact that at
the margin an increase in consumption has the same effect as the induced cost of future
distortions. Indeed, we show in the following section that the first order condition of Problem
(PE) at t˜ reduces to:
β
T − t˜
 T∑
τ=t˜+1
A′(qτ )
 = 1. (13)
Furthermore, we show that the solution of Problem (I) is interior at t˜. This implies that
ct˜ = ct˜+1; and, by our characterization of the repayment phase in this corollary, ct˜+1 = cτ ,
for any τ > t˜+ 1. Note that this is a T period version of the equation that characterizes the
interior equilibrium repayment in the T = 3 economy, equation (4).
On the contrary, in the debt accumulation phase, up to period t˜− 1, the agent consumes
off of deficit spending; that is, transfers from time 1 are zero. As a consequence, consumption
is not equalized across periods. In fact, it is declining over time due to the agents’ self-control
problem (β < 1).
We discuss now the consequences of extending the horizon T of this economy. We inves-
tigate whether the maximal debt Dt˜ grows without bound as T goes to infinity. To this end
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we construct a sequence of replica economies by allowing the aggregate endowment of the
economy to grow at the same rate as T , so that the endowment per period remains constant
along the sequence, and consumption does not become infinitesimal nor unboundedly large
in every period. More precisely, the replica economies are characterized by aggregate en-
dowment ρk and ρT periods, for some ρ > 1 (such that ρT is an integer). This construction
guarantees that the characterization obtained in Proposition 8 and Corollary 9 hold for all
replicas, along the sequence for which ρ→∞.
Let t˜(ρ) denote the last accumulation period at the equilibrium of the replica economy
corresponding to ρ; t˜(1) is then the last accumulation period in the original economy with
endowment k and T periods.
Corollary B. 2 Along the sequence of replica economies, the maximal level of debt Dt˜(ρ)
increases with ρ and Dt˜(ρ) →∞ as ρ→∞.8
Proof. Consider an economy with aggregate endowment k and T periods such that the
characterization in Proposition 8 holds. Now consider replicas of this economy characterized
by aggregate endowment ρk and ρT periods, for some ρ > 1. Let t˜(ρ) denote the last accu-
mulation period at the equilibrium of the replica economy; t˜(1) is then the last accumulation
period in the original economy with endowment k and T periods. Let ct(ρ) (respectively.
ct(1)) denote the consumption at period t in the replica economy (respectively. in the orig-
inal economy). We show that the maximal debt of any replica ρ increases with respect to
the original economy, Dt˜(ρ) > Dt˜(1). As a consequence, the sequence Dt˜(ρ) increases in ρ.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume by way of contradiction that Dt˜(ρ) ≤ Dt˜(1).
Consider first the case in which Dt˜(ρ) = Dt˜(1) and the sequence of repayments is unchanged,
satisfying (12). Note that in this case, as the characterization in Proposition 8 holds, con-
sumption is constant at equilibrium from the last accumulation period up to the last period
(hence over the repayment period). Therefore, we must have
t˜(ρ) = T + t˜(1)
ct(1) =
k − c1(1)
t˜(1) + 1
, for any t˜(1) ≤ t ≤ T
cT+t(ρ) =
2k − c1(ρ)
t˜(1) + 1
, for any t˜(1) ≤ t ≤ T
From the first order condition of Problem I it can be shown that, while c1(ρ) > c1(1),
cT+t(ρ) > ct(1), for any t > t˜(1). As a consequence, comparing the first order condition of
8It should be noted that t˜(ρ) also grows without bounds along the sequence of replica economies; see the
Online Appendix.
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Problem PE in the replica economy at at T + t˜(1)−1 with that of of the original economy at
t˜(1)−1 implies that the deficit in the replica economy is higher than in the original economy.
Solving backwards the first order condition of Problem PE we have that the maximal debt
accumulated in the replica economy must be higher than in the original economy, Dt˜(ρ) >
Dt˜(1) yielding the desired contradiction. Note that, as a consequence of equations (12)
and (13), if Dt˜(ρ) = Dt˜(1) the sequence of repayments must indeed be unchanged. A similar
argument can be applied to the case in which Dt˜(ρ) < Dt˜(1). In this case in fact the repayment
phase still needs to satisfy equations (12) and (13). As a consequence, if Dt˜(ρ) < Dt˜(1)
the repayment phase is possibly shorter. A fortiori then cT+t(ρ) > ct(1) for any t such
that T + t is in the repayment phase of the replica economy. Comparing the first order
condition of Problem PE in the replica economy at at t˜(ρ) − 1 with that of of the original
economy at t˜(1)−1 and solving backwards the first order condition of Problem PE produces
a contradiction, as in the previous case.
We conclude that along the sequence of replica economies the maximal debt accumulated
must be increasing, Dt˜(ρ) increases with ρ. In fact, equations (12) and (13) imply that the
repayment phase ρT−t˜(ρ) must also be increasing. But the sequence of maximal debt cannot
have an upper bound. If it did, the sequence t˜(ρ) would be bounded and the length of the
repayment phase would instead grow to infinity, ρT − t˜(ρ) → ∞. This is not possible. In
fact, in the proof of Corollary 9 we have shown that the repayment phase can be alternatively
characterized solving (12) recursively. Proceeding along these lines we obtain
lim
ρ→∞
β
ρT − t˜(ρ)
ρT−t˜(ρ)−1∏
j=1
(
1 +
β
j
)
= 0 if lim
ρ→∞
[
ρT − t˜(ρ)]→∞
This can be shown by applying the ratio convergence test (after a log transformation). As a
consequence, A′(qt˜(ρ)) → 0 as ρ → ∞. In other words, the right-hand-side of equation (13)
converges to 0 as ρ→∞, violating equation (13) itself.
The intuition is as follows. Consider a k and a T such that the characterization in
Proposition 8 holds. Now double both k and T (that is, consider the replica economy
corresponding to ρ = 2). At equilibrium all transfers must go to support consumption in
period 1, in the last accumulation period, and in the repayment phase. If the repayment
phase stayed the same in terms of its length and of the size of repayments, consumption
along the repayment phase would be larger: the aggregate endowment available to transfer
over the same number of periods would have essentially doubled. In this case, however, the
political process represented by the solution to Problem (PE) would require smoothing and
hence higher deficits and for a longer number of periods implying a higher debt. Indeed,
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at equilibrium, the repayment phase is longer and the maximal debt it supports is higher.
More generally, along the sequence of replica economies in which the aggregate endowment
grows at the same rate as the number of periods, the maximal level of debt increases. But
the sequence of maximal debt cannot have an upper bound as this would imply that the
length of the repayment phase is finite in the limit and consumption along this phase would
grow unboundedly, violating the first order conditions of the accumulation phase.
Another possible intuition for the result is that spreading the repayment of any finite
amount of debt over a large number of future periods induces smaller and smaller marginal
distortions that converge to 0. As a consequence, debt accumulation must also grow without
bounds as the number of periods in the repayment phase.
In conclusion, when voters are time inconsistent, while convex distortions induce debt
repayments to be smoothed over time, debt accumulation can nonetheless be very large to
the point that debt grows without bound as the number of periods increases. This is the
case, of course, unless debt limits are imposed. In other words, debt limits are necessary to
limit the inefficient distortions which the economy must incur to repay large accumulated
debts at equilibrium.
Other mechanisms may limit debt accumulation and hence distortions. Reducing the fre-
quency of elections so that there is voting every n > 1 periods may lead to greater political
commitment. A formal analysis of the effect of such a restrictions turns out to be complex.
One important modeling choice is how the government is expected to behave in non-election
periods. If the government chooses policies in non-election periods by attempting to sat-
isfy popular opinion (governing by opinion polls), then the outcome would be equivalent to
the one characterized in this Section. However, if the government can commit in election
periods to its behavior in non-election periods, then this would presumably enhance politi-
cal commitment and reduce debt accumulation, thereby producing beneficial effects on the
equilibrium outcome.
C. Gul-Pesendorfer Preferences
The paper provides an analysis of voters who are characterized by quasi-hyperbolic pref-
erences. One could also contemplate a setting in which agents experience temptation costs
in each period a-la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004). In this Section, we show that the
underlying forces driving our results do not change in such an alternative modeling setup.
Indeed, suppose that, as in Gul and Pesendorfer two functions u and v govern an individ-
ual’s valuations of choices from a set X. We adopt the assumption on temptation in Gul
and Pesendorfer (2004), i.e, temptation in period t is given by the option of consuming the
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maximal feasible amount in period t. To their model we first introduce the possibility of
illiquid assets and then add government debt.
As in the baseline model used in the paper, there is a wealth k and three periods. In
period 1 the agent does not consume but just saves for subsequent periods. If there is no
access to illiquid assets, and therefore, no possibility of commitment, in period 1 the agent
can only pass on all the wealth to period 2, and in period 2 the agent chooses how much to
consume. Thus, in this case, payoffs are given by
U3(c3) = u(c3),
U2 (c2, c3) = u(c2) + v(c2)− v(c2 + c3) + u(c3),
U1 (c2, c3) = U2 (c2, c3)
Let cU2 , c
U
3 be the solution of this problem when no illiquid assets are available, i.e., the
non commitment solution. The first order conditions for this solution are:
u′(cU2 ) = u
′(cU3 )− v′(cU2 ), (16)
In contrast, when illiquid assets are available, the situation is quite different. In this
case the maximal feasible amount of consumption by agent 2 is s12, agent 1’s saving choice.
Therefore, self 1, by choosing s12 < k, can reduce the temptation of self 2 with respect to
the case of illiquid assets. This will indeed be the case at equilibrium with illiquid assets.9
Let us begin the characterization of equilibrium with period 3. Given savings s13 in illiquid
assets in the first period as well as savings in the second period s23, utility in the third period
is
U3 = u(s13 + s23).
In period 2, given savings s13 in illiquid assets and s12 in assets that are now liquid, utility
is given by
U2 = u (s12 − s23) + v (s12 − s23)− v (s12) + u(s13 + s23).
As we noticed, if s12 < k, the fact that assets s13 are illiquid reduces the temptation for the
agent in period 2. Thus, the optimal solution in period 1 is to choose s12, s13 to maximize
U1 = u (s12) + u (s13)
because, by ensuring that s12 = c2, this eliminates temptations in period 2. Let c
∗
2, c
∗
3 be
the solution to this maximization problem, i.e., the commitment solution. Note that c∗2, c
∗
3
9Assuming that self 1 does not consume and hence experience no instantaneous temptation induces a more
clear-cut result, but the same arguments would go through if we were to allow for period 1 consumption.
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satisfies:
u′(c2) = u′(c3). (17)
Contrasting equations (17) and (16) highlights the demand for commitment. Indeed, absent
commitment, in period 2, the agent would want to shift resources from period 3 to period 2
whenever v′ > 0 and u′′(c) + v′′(c) < 0.
We now introduce the possibility of government debt. For the purpose of this Web
Appendix we assume that there are no distortions in order to make the comparison with the
β − δ model used in the paper more direct.
Assume that de is the candidate equilibrium level of government debt. From the optimal
savings and portfolio choices of the agent we must have:
U3 = u(s13 + s23 − de),
U2 = u (s12 − s23 + de) + v (s12 − s23 + de)− v (s12 + de) + u(s13 + s23 − de).
So, if de ≤ c∗2, the optimal solution in period 1 sets s12 = c∗2 − de, s13 = c∗3 + de which allows
restoring the full commitment utilities in all periods.
However, as long as the debt limit d is below the non-commitment level of consumption,
cU2 , the equilibrium debt will be raised up to the debt limit. Consider on the contrary a debt
level d such that d < d ≤ cU2 , in period 2, the actual payoff function determining voting
over government debt that candidates implicitly maximize is
U2 = u (c
∗
2 + d) + v (c
∗
2 + d)− v
(
s12 + d
)
+ u(s13 + s23 − d).
Thus, whenever d < d, the agent has an incentive to vote for higher debt.
This reasoning can easily be extended to show that when d > cU2 , then equilibrium
debt is equal to cU2 thus showing the analogue of our Proposition 1 for the case of Gul and
Pesendorfer preferences. The case of distortions can also be treated in a similar fashion.
D. Period One Consumption
The paper focused on an environment in which consumption takes place only in periods
2 and 3. In principle, individuals could also make consumption decisions while planning for
future consumption. Foreseeing their future behavior, individuals can then adjust their im-
mediate consumption and thereby affect their future budget. We now consider such settings.
As in the paper, there is a measure 1 of voters who live for three periods. In period 1 voters
have a wealth k from which to finance consumption over three periods. Preferences over
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consumption sequence c1, c2, c3 are given by
U1 (c1, c2, c3) = u(c1) + βδu(c2) + βδ
2u(c3),
U2 (c2, c3) = u(c2) + βδu(c3),
U(c3) = u(c3),
(18)
where u is a continuous and strictly concave utility function. We also assume that the utility
function is three times continuously differentiable. As in the paper, we assume that δ = 1
and that agents are sophisticated. We use the notation used in the paper for the commitment
and no-commitment consumption choices.
While period-one consumption may affect the budget left for one’s period-two self, the
demand for commitment is similar to that without period-one consumption. Namely, com-
mitment leads to lower second period consumption: c∗2 < c
U
2 .
Consider first the benchmark in which debt is non-distortionary.
In period 1 an agent who predicts equilibrium per-capita debt levels of d, chooses savings
intended for period 2, denoted by s12 and for period 3, denoted by s13, to solve
max
s12,s13
u (c1) + βu (s12 + d− s23) + βu (s13 + s23 − d) .
In period 2 a voter with preference parameter β chooses savings s23 to solve
max
s23
u (s12 + d− s23) + βu (s13 + s23 − d) .
The political process proceeds as in the paper.
Equilibrium Characterization. The Incomplete Ricardian Equivalence characterized in
Proposition 1 in the paper still holds. Namely, we have that:
Proposition D. 1 (Incomplete Ricardian Equivalence )
1. If d ≤ c∗2 then both candidates offer platforms with debt d. Equilibrium consumption
is (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3).
2. If c∗2 < d < c
U
2 then both candidates offer platforms with debt d. In equilibrium,
second-period consumption is c2 = d.
3. If d ≥ cU2 then any d such that cU2 ≤ d ≤ k is part of an equilibrium. Equilibrium
consumption is
(
cU1 , c
U
2 , c
U
3
)
.
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Proof. 1. Assume by way of contradiction that equilibrium debt is d∗ < d. If this is the
case, a voter can implement the commitment sequence of consumption c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3 by choosing
s12 = c
∗
2 − d∗, and s13 = c∗3 + d∗. This is feasible since d∗ < d < c∗2. Hence, these are the
optimal choices for the voter. But, by definition of c∗2, c
∗
3, u
′ (c∗2) > βu
′ (c∗3), and therefore, in
period 2 all voters would vote for a candidate who offered a slightly higher debt. Thus, the
only debt that can be part of an equilibrium is d. Given a debt of d, in period 1, each voter
chooses s12 = c
∗
2 − d, s13 = c∗3 + d. Given these saving choices, none of the voters would vote
for a candidate that offered a lower debt in the second period, proving that debt and this
sequence of consumption constitute a unique equilibrium.
2. Assume by way of contradiction that, in equilibrium, a debt d∗ < d is implemented.
As in part (1), voters choose savings to restore commitment as much as possible. Assume
that c∗2 < d
∗ (otherwise, the proof of part (1) applies). Each agent maximizes
u (c1) + βu (c2) + βu (k − c1 − c2)
s.t. c2 ≥ d∗.
The first order conditions yield
u′ (c1) = βu′ (k − c1 − d∗) > u′ (c2) = u′ (d∗)
because d∗ > c∗2 (recall that u
′ (c∗2) = u
′ (c∗3)). This means that the agent sets s12 = 0 since
second-period consumption is already higher than desired by the first-period self. However,
since d∗ < cU2 , u
′ (d) > βu′ (c3). Thus, in period 2 all voters would vote for higher debts
contradicting the assumption that d is an equilibrium debt level. Finally, to conclude that
a debt of d is indeed part of an equilibrium, observe that, given d, by similar reasoning, the
optimal saving choices of all voters would lead to u′
(
d
)
> βu′ (c3). Thus, no voter would
vote for lower debts.
3. We first show that the claimed outcomes are part of an equilibrium. Given any
candidate equilibrium debt k > d∗ ≥ cU2 that is expected by voters in period 1, an optimal
policy of a voter in period 1 is a choice of s12 = 0 and s13 = c
U
3 −
(
d∗ − cU2
)
. In addition,
given d∗, in equilibrium, s23 = d∗− cU2 is to be saved in period 2 for period 3. Given this
policy, by the definition of cU2 , c
U
3 , we have
u′
(
cU2
)
= βu′
(
cU3
)
giving no incentive to any period-2 self to change her savings plan away from s23. Suppose
now that the period-1 self were to change (e.g., increase) s13. Then, the period-2 self would
make an offsetting change (reduction) in s23 to restore period 2 optimality. Any change in
21
s12 would similarly be offset (recall that since d
∗ ≥ cU2 , even if s12 = 0, the period-2 self can
unilaterally choose cU2 ). Thus, the period-1 self has no incentive to deviate.
10
Given these policies for the voters, consider a deviation to d < d∗ in period 2. As long as
the deviation is small (d ≥ cU2 ), all voters are indifferent (they can just make an offsetting
reduction in s23 to restore the desired consumption sequence). If the deviation is large
(d < cU2 ), then voters who can no longer make such offsetting reduction in s23. All voters
would therefore vote against a candidate offering such a deviation. A deviation to d > d∗
would leave all voters indifferent because they could make offsetting changes in s23.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium debt d∗ < cU2 . Such an expected debt would
constrain period-2 consumption for the voters, leading to victory in period 2 for a candidate
offering d > d∗.
When debt is distortionary, the analysis changes slightly when one accounts for consump-
tion in the first period. The equilibrium characterization is analogous to that corresponding
to the case in which consumption occurs only in the second and third periods. Indeed, let
c∗1 (d) , c
∗
2 (d) , and c
∗
3 (d) be the commitment sequence of consumption given debt d, namely,
the solution to the following problem:
max {u (c1) + β (u (c2) + u (c3))}
s.t. c1 + c2 + c3 = k − ηd
Analogously, let cU1 (d) , c
U
2 (d) , and c
U
3 (d) be the corresponding quantities without commit-
ment. We define d∗ as the solution of c∗2 (d
∗) = d∗.11
We now introduce an artificial constrained-maximization problem for a voter of preference
parameter β (1 + η) < 1.
maxu(c1) + β [u(c2) + u(c3)] (19)
s.t. u′ (c2) = β (1 + η)u′ (c3) ,
c1 + c2 + c3 = k − dη.
Notice that when there is consumption in the first period, the optimal consumption is
not simply prescribed by the second-period constraint, since the resources available to the
second-period self are endogenous and determined by consumption in the first period. Denote
10There are multiple ways for the period-1 self to implement the uncommitted sequence, involving increas-
ing s12 and s23 by the same amounts with offsetting reductions to s13. All these are weakly dominated by
the proposed sequence.
11Notice that c∗2(0) ≥ 0, while c∗2(k/η) = 0 < k/η, and so the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees the
existence of such a d∗.
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by (cη1 (d) , c
η
2 (d) , c
η
3 (d)) the consumption sequence that solves the problem . We now define
d∗∗ to be the solution of d∗∗ = cη2 (d
∗∗).12 It is easy to show that d∗ < d∗∗.
Proposition D. 2 (Distortionary Equilibrium Debt)
1. If β (1 + η) > 1 then in equilibrium there is no debt and consumption is given by
(c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3).
2. Assume that β (1 + η) < 1. If d ≤ d∗, then equilibrium debt is given by d and
consumption is given by
(
c∗1
(
d
)
, c∗2
(
d
)
, c∗3
(
d
))
. If d∗ < d ≤ d∗∗, then equilibrium debt
is given by d and period 2 consumption is given by c2 = d. If d > d
∗∗, then debt is
given by d∗∗ and period 2 consumption is given by c2 = d∗∗.
Proof. 1. We first show that there is an equilibrium with zero debt. Given an expected
second-period debt of zero, in period 1 voters choose the mix of liquid and illiquid assets
s12 = c
∗
2 and s13 = c
∗
3 that implements the commitment consumption sequence (c
∗
1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3).
Given this mix of savings, u′ (c∗2) = u
′ (c∗3). Thus, if β (1 + η) > 1, u
′ (c∗2) < β (1 + η)u
′ (c∗3)
and voters have no incentive to vote for positive debt. Consider now any level of expected
debt d. The mix of savings has to be such that u′ (s12 + d) ≤ u′ (s13 + s23 − d). But then
u′ (s12 + d) < β (1 + η)u′ (s13 + s23 − d), inducing voters to vote to reduce debt.
2. Consider now the case in which β (1 + η) < 1. Given any d < d∗ and any expected
d ≤ d, optimal savings in period 2 are given by s23 = 0 and s12, s13 are such that u′ (s12 + d) =
u′ (s13 − d). Thus, u′ (s12 + d) > β (1 + η)u′ (s13 − d) and voters would vote to increase
debt. Thus, in this scenario equilibrium debt must be d and consumption must be given
by
(
c∗1
(
d
)
, c∗2
(
d
)
, c∗3
(
d
))
. If d∗ < d ≤ d∗∗, then, by the same reasoning, equilibrium debt
must be at least d∗. But then, by the definition of d∗, debt is higher than second-period
commitment consumption, and optimal savings are at a corner: s12 = s23 = 0, implying that
c2 = d. Because d < d
∗∗, we then have that β (1 + η)u′ (c3) < u′ (c2) < u′ (c3). This implies
that voters vote for higher debt unless d = d. Finally, If d ≥ d > d∗∗, then by the definition
of d∗∗, u′ (d) < β (1 + η)u′ (c3), so voters would vote to reduce debt. This proves that, for
any d ≥ d∗∗ equilibrium debt is given by d∗∗.
Welfare Analysis. When consumption takes place only in periods 2 and 3, the anal-
ysis of the impact of distortions on welfare is dramatically simplified. Indeed, equilibrium
consumption is essentially governed by the second-period constraint. Technically, we can
12Again, the Intermediate Value Theorem assures that such d∗∗ always exists since cη2(0) = c
U
2 (0) ≥ 0, and
cη2(k/η) = 0 < k/η, and the Theorem of the Maximum implies that c
η
2(d) is continuous.
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use the implicit function theorem to derive a full ranking of welfare for different distortion
levels η. When consumption occurs in period 1 as well, the budget available in period 2 is
endogenous and may depend on η. Nonetheless, we can still determine the detrimental effects
of distortions, as well as the impacts of suffering from self-control problems. The following
result provides a comparison of equilibrium welfare with and without distortions when debt
limits are large (namely, d > d∗∗).
Proposition D. 3 (Welfare Effects of Distortions) Whenever β < β (1 + η) < 1 the
equilibrium with distortions determined by η leads to lower first period welfare than the equi-
librium corresponding to no distortions, when η = 0. If β (1 + η) > 1, then first period
welfare is higher than that induced by any β (1 + η) < 1.
Proof. Consider the following maximization problem:
maxu(c1) + β [u(c2) + u(c3)]
s.t. u′(c2) = β(1 + η)u′(c3)
c1 + c2 + c3 = k − ηc2.
(20)
This is an artificial problem corresponding to an agent who chooses the debt level and her
consumption plan in tandem but consuming c2 destroys resources just as debt does. In
particular, this problem generates a higher overall utility (from period 1’s perspective) than
that experienced by an agent who consumes cη1 (d
∗∗) , cη2 (d
∗∗) , cη3 (d
∗∗) because such an agent
takes the equilibrium level of debt as given and cannot alter it unilaterally. The latter
generates the equilibrium level of welfare for distortions η. Furthermore, the two coincide
when η = 0. We now show that the maximized objective of problem (20) is decreasing in η.
Indeed, suppose η1 > η2. Denote the solution of (20) for distortions η1 by (c1, c2, c3) . We
now approximate a policy under distortions η2 small enough that it satisfies the constraints
and generates a strictly higher value for the objective.
For η2 close enough to η1, there exists ε > 0, ε < c3 such that
u′(c2) = β(1 + η2)u′(c3 − ε).
Therefore,
u′(c2) = β(1 + η2)
[
u′(c3)− εu′′(c3) +O(ε2)
]
.
Since (c1, c2, c3) is a solution to the problem with distortions η1, u
′(c2) = β(1 + η1)u′(c3). It
follows that:
ε =
(η2 − η1)u′(c2)
β(1 + η2)u′′(c3)
+O(ε2).
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Consider then the policy (c1 + ε+ (η1 − η2) c2, c2, c3− ε) when the distortions are η2. Notice
that, by construction, this policy satisfies the two constraints in problem (20). The difference
between the generated objective and the maximal value of the objective under distortions
η1 is then:
∆ = [u(c1 + ε+ (η1 − η2) c2)− u(c1)] + β [u(c3 − ε)− u(c3)] .
Using a first order approximation,
∆ = (ε+ (η1 − η2) c2)u′(c1)− βεu′(c3) =
= (η1 − η2) c2u′(c1) + (η2 − η1)u
′(c2)u′(c1)
β(1 + η2)u′′(c3)
− (η2 − η1)u
′(c2)u′(c3)
(1 + η2)u′′(c3)
+O(ε2)
=
(η1 − η2)
(1 + η2)
u′(c2)
[
u′(c1)c2
u′(c2)
− u
′(c1)− βu′(c3)
βu′′(c3)
]
+O(ε2).
Notice that the solution to problem (20) with distortions η1 must satisfy u
′(c1) = β [u′(c2) + u′(c3)]
and so:
∆ =
(η1 − η2)
(1 + η2)
u′(c2)
[
u′(c1)c2
u′(c2)
− u
′(c2)
u′′(c3)
]
+O(ε2),
which from concavity of the instantaneous utility u, is positive whenever η1 and η2 are
close enough. In particular, the optimal solution for problem (20) with distortions η2 must
generate a strictly higher level of the objective function than the solution with distortions
η1. It follows that welfare in our distortion economy is lower under any η > 0 relative to the
case of η = 0.
Last, notice that when β(1 +η) < 1, all agents achieve their commitment solution absent
debt, an consequently the maximal period 1 utility under the budget constraint. From
Proposition 2, this is no longer the case when β(1 + η) > 1 and so period 1 utility is lower
for distortions exceeding 1− β.
As in the model analyzed in paper, there are two contrasting effects of positive distortions.
On the negative side, given that there is debt in equilibrium, the presence of distortions causes
wealth destruction. On the positive side, distortions relax the commitment constraint in
the artificial maximization that determines equilibrium debt. In fact, when η is very high
(η > 1 − β), distortions serve as a full commitment device since, in equilibrium, voters do
not vote for positive debt in the second period. The proposition shows that the negative
effect dominates.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of distortions in the case of instantaneous log-utility, where
we take the budget to be k = 3 and the population time preferences to be β = 0.7. The
left panel of the figure illustrates the consumption patterns and wealth destroyed. Notice
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Figure 1: Outcomes for Log Instantaneous Utility (k = 3, β = 0.7)
that consumption declines with η in periods 1 and 2, but is increasing in period 3. This
reflects the two effects discussed above that distortions have – on the one hand, they destroy
wealth, and indeed, wealth destruction increases with η; On the other hand, they relax the
constraints in period 2, which allows for more delayed consumption. The right panel of
the figure illustrates the impact of distortions on welfare from the perspective of each self.
Welfare for period-1 and period-2 selves declines with η, in line with the statement in the
proposition. This indicates that the effect of wealth destruction outweighs the benefits of
smoothing derived from greater distortions, and so overall greater distortions do not help
individuals early in the process. However, since period 3 consumption is increasing, so does
welfare in period 3.
Heterogeneity. We now consider what happens when agents are heterogeneous in their
present-bias parameter β. In analogy to our previous notation, we will denote by c∗t (β; d)
and cηt (β; d) the commitment solution for debt d and the solution to the constrained problem
(19) for each individual of preference parameter β.
We start by assuming that second period consumption cη2 (β; d) increases monotonically
in β. This holds when the utility function has sufficient curvature. We note that there are
many preferences for which this does not hold. For instance, with log utility, consumption is
not monotonic. However, even in such a case our initial discussion will be valid for a fairly
wide class of distributions of the β parameter. We discuss the more general case below. We
note that this assumption stands in stark contrast with the environment in which there is
no consumption in the first period. Indeed, in that case cη2 (β; d) is decreasing and c
∗
t (β; d)
is a constant function independent of β.
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Figure 2: Consumption Patterns for a Given Debt Level
Let β∗ be such that G( 1
1+η
) − (β∗) = 1/2. That is, half the population has preferences
that are between β∗ and 1
1+η
. Figure 3 depicts the shape of commitment and no-commitment
consumption levels in period 2 as a function of preferences for a particular debt level.
The agent of type β∗ turns out to be the pivotal agent for determining debt in this
environment. We can now define d∗ (β∗) and d∗∗ (β∗) as the solutions of d∗ = c∗2 (β
∗, d∗) and
d∗∗ = cη2 (β
∗, d∗∗).13
Proposition D. 4 1. If βM (1 + η) > 1, then in equilibrium there is no debt, and con-
sumption is given by c∗1 (β) , c
∗
2 (β) , c
∗
3 (β).
2. Assume that βM (1 + η) < 1. If d ≤ d∗∗ (β∗), then equilibrium debt is given by d. If
d > d∗∗ (β∗), then debt is given by d∗∗ (β∗).
3. For any equilibrium debt level d, individual consumption for an agent of preference
13Existence and uniqueness of these debt levels follow the same arguments used for the case of a homoge-
nous electorate.
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parameter β, period-2 consumption level in equilibrium is given by:
c2(β; d) =

cη2 (β; d) β ≤ βL(d)
d βL(d) ≤ β < βH(d)
c∗2 (β; d) β ≥ βH(d)
.
With respect to the distribution of preferences, notice that a shift in distribution changes
the debt structure in the economy only when it modifies the preferences β∗ of the ‘pivotal
agent’. As β∗ increases, c∗2(β
∗; d) and cη2(β
∗; d) increase for all d, and therefore both d∗ and
d∗∗ increase.
We say G′ is a median preserving spread of G if both share the same median βM and for
any β < βM , G
′(β) ≥ G(β), while for any β > βM , G′(β) ≤ G(β). Intuitively, this implies
that, under G′, more weight is put on more extreme values of β (see Malamud and Trojani
(2009) for applications to a variety of other economic phenomena).
The above discussion then implies the following corollary.
Corollary D. 1 (Distributional Shifts) 1. Assume G( 1
1+η
) = G′( 1
1+η
). If G′ First Or-
der Stochastically Dominates G, and the corresponding medians βM , β
′
M <
1
1+η
, then
equilibrium debt under G′ is (weakly) higher than that under G.
2. If G′ is a Median Preserving Spread of G, then equilibrium debt under G′ is (weakly)
lower than that under G.
Part 1 of this corollary says that, as the population becomes more “virtuous” or less
subject to self-control problems, equilibrium debt increases. This is potentially surprising
but is a natural consequence of the logic of our model. There are two ways to glean intuition
for this result. The more mechanical one is to recall that equilibrium debt is equal to second
period consumption. As β∗ increases, so does the desired second period consumption of the
pivotal agent β∗. Thus, equilibrium debt increases. Alternatively, notice that in our model
debt arises because of the desire of the pivotal agent to constrain her future self, and the
subsequent response of the political system undoing this commitment. The more virtuous
the pivotal agent, the higher the level of debt that is required to prevent this agent from
attempting to commit at an even higher level.
We now discuss the more general case in which second period consumption may not be
increasing in β. For any η, denote by dp the debt level such that:
G {β | cη2(β; dp) < dp} =
1
2
.
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Proposition D.1. can now be restated with dp playing the role of d∗∗ (β∗). If second period
consumption is decreasing in β, then dp will correspond to cη2(βM ; d
∗∗): the median voter will
be pivotal. Otherwise, there may be multiple pivotal voters.
We now discuss how the welfare of different agent types is affected by the presence of
illiquid assets. Our result in Proposition 5 of the paper showing that agents would be made
better off in the first period if illiquid assets were penalized obviously extends to the case
where the degree of heterogeneity is limited. Furthermore, if cη2 (β, d) is increasing in β, it
is possible to show that, for any degree of heterogeneity, all agents with β ≤ β∗ as well as
those with sufficiently high β are made worse off by the presence of illiquid assets: the former
group because for these types, debt is higher than cη2(β; d) and second period consumption
is completely out of transfers, so the logic of Proposition 5 immediately holds for these
agents; the latter group because these types do not have much of a self-control problem, so
the presence of illiquid assets gains them little commitment but generates a destruction of
resources through debt.
E. Private Debt with Debt Limits
In the paper, when we discuss borrowing on the private market from intermediaries such
as credit card companies, we assume that there is no debt limit. This has no effect on the
results generated when β (1 + η) > 1. In this case, in equilibrium there is no debt and
consumption is given by (c∗2, c
∗
3). However, when β(1 + η) < 1, corner solutions may emerge
when the debt limit is sufficiently small.
Formally, notice that U1 (c
∗
2 (d) , c
∗
3 (d)) is decreasing in d and so there is a unique d
C > 0
for which U1
(
c∗2
(
dC
)
, c∗3
(
dC
))
= U1 (c
η
2 (0) , c
η
3 (0)). Debt d
C is the debt level that renders the
agent indifferent between borrowing dC but perfectly smoothing utility between periods 2 and
3, and not borrowing but accepting the constrained commitment allocation. It may be the
case that c∗2
(
dC
)
, c∗3
(
dC
)
is not feasible because it would violate the constraint that s12 ≥ 0.
Thus, we need to consider the case in which s12 = 0, and second period consumption is equal
to d. Let dCC denote the debt level such that U1
(
dCC , k − dCC (1 + η)) = U1 (cη2 (0) , cη3 (0)).
We have:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium with Credit Cards) Assume β (1 + η) < 1. If
d > max
{
dC , dCC
}
then agents make portfolio decisions in period 1 that ensure no debt in
the second period: equilibrium debt is zero, the equilibrium consumption sequence is given by
(cη2 (0) , c
η
3 (0)), and first-period welfare is increasing in η. If d ≤ max
{
dC , dCC
}
, then debt
is d, and consumption is either
(
c∗2
(
d
)
, c∗3
(
d
))
or
(
d, k − d (1 + η)) .
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Proof. Suppose sˆ12, sˆ13, and d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
> 0 constitute part of an equilibrium. If
d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
< d, then the second period first-order condition of the agent must hold, and
therefore we must have:
u′
(
sˆ12 + d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
))
= β (1 + η)u′
(
sˆ13 − d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
(1 + η)
)
.
The following savings plan constitutes an improving plan in period 1: s12 = sˆ12+ d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
,
s13 = sˆ13−d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
(1 + η). Given this savings plan, the second period first-order condi-
tions are satisfied with d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
= 0 and consumption at t = 2 and t = 3 is unchanged.
However, this saving plan increases the resources available to the consumer in period 1 by
ηd
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
. These can be distributed between periods 2 and 3, while still satisfying the
first order condition. In particular, (cη2 (0) , c
η
3 (0)) is the resulting consumption sequence
which clearly satisfies the second period first-order condition.
Let us now consider the case in which the debt limit is binding (d
(
sˆ12, sˆ13, d
)
= d) in
equilibrium. In this case, the agent must either be consuming her commitment consumption
sequence
(
c∗2
(
d
)
, c∗3
(
d
))
, or we must have c2 = d and s12 = 0: otherwise, the agent could
improve her first-period utility by reducing s12 and increasing s13 without changing debt.
Thus, we have two possible equilibria that may be induced by a first period choice: (1)
d = 0 and consumption (cη2 (0) , c
η
3 (0)) or (2) d = d and consumption of either
(
c∗2
(
d
)
, c∗3
(
d
))
or
(
d, k − d (1 + η)). These two alternative plans yield utilities of U1 (cη2 (0) , cη3 (0)) and either
U1
(
c∗2
(
d
)
, c∗3
(
d
))
or U1
(
d, k − d (1 + η)) respectively. We now note that U1 (cη2 (0) , cη3 (0))
is independent of d while both U1
(
c∗2
(
d
)
, c∗3
(
d
))
and U1
(
d, k − d (1 + η)) are decreasing in
d . In either case, from the definitions of dC and dCC , it follows that for d¯ ≤ dJ (where J
may be either C or CC) and the agent chooses to commit and accepts that in the second
period debt will be binding. For d¯ > max
{
dC , dCC
}
, the agent gives up commitment and
will choose a debt of zero.
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